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"Swallow Blue" is Einar Skinnarland, a native of Rjukan, the town nearest the
plant. From his hut on the Hardanger Plateau above Rjukan, Skinnarland, along
with other members of the Resistance both outside and within the plant, served
as the Special Operations Executive's eyes on Vemork. "IMI" is the codename for
heavy water. By "reprisals" after an attack, Skinnarland means the Germans
would naturally suspect and take revenge on local Norwegians, a great concern
to the Resistance fighters, who grew up in the area.
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Skinnarland's boss in London was Leif Tronstad, chief of intelligence,
espionage, and sabotage for the Norwegian Resistance effort and, as it happens,
codesigner of the original high-concentration plant at Vemork. All messages
between the two were in Norwegian and had to be translated for their British
counterparts. "Limpet" here refers to plastic explosive. To keep retaliations
against locals to a minimum, Tronstad suggests the saboteurs leave behind
British effects so the Germans will think the attack was conducted by British
commandos.
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"Bonzo" is Knut Haukelid, another Resistance operative, who is heading up the
operation to sink the ferry. Through Skinnarland, Haukelid is passing on what
he's heard from one of the partisans' most valuable contacts inside the plant,
Kjell Nielsen, Vemork's transport engineer. Nielsen believes the amount of
useful heavy water the Germans would be able to secure from the Norwegian
stocks is not worth the inevitable reprisals on locals. As the transfer of the
heavy water is set to begin in three days, Skinnarland requests an immediate
response from London.
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Tronstad obliges by responding the same evening. (The year, given here as 1943,
is a transcriber's error.) Fearing the worst—that even such uneven stocks
of heavy water could help the Nazis create an A-bomb—the Allied High
Command decides that the probable loss of Norwegian lives from the explosion
aboard the ferry and by drowning in the freezing water of Lake Tinn, as well as
through Nazi reprisals, is regrettable but necessary.
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In the wee hours of February 20, the day the ferry sailed with the heavy water,
Knut Haukelid and two companions slipped aboard the vessel, affixed a long tube
of plastic charge in the bow belowdecks, and retreated. The charge was set to
go off roughly 45 minutes after the ferry left the dock at 10 a.m., to ensure
the boat had reached deep water. As this message of Skinnarland's three days
later declares, the operation was a success—save for the loss of 14
innocent lives.
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The day after Skinnarland's telegram describing the outcome of the attack,
Tronstad replies. London is pleased but still concerned about any heavy-water
stocks remaining at Vemork that might make it to Germany. They just can't risk
any chance for a Nazi nuclear bomb.
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Over a week later Tronstad and his English bosses in London still seek
confirmation of exactly what went down with the ferry. Beyond assurances from
Norwegians who swore they saw the loading of heavy water into barrels at the
plant, confirmation was impossible, however, as the barrels now lay at the
bottom of Lake Tinn. After the war, Karl Wirtz, a German expert on heavy water,
claimed that German officals at Vemork had indeed put dummy barrels on the
ferry. Only the NOVA expedition in 2003 confirmed that the shipment did hold
the coveted compound after all.
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